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"Proving a thing even while you contradict it": 
FICTIONS, BELIEFS, AND LEGITIMATION IN 
THE MEMOIRS OF BARRY LYNDON, ESQ. 
ROBERT P. FLETCHER 
William Makepeace Thackeray, the sentimental-ironist amongst the 
Victorian novelists, is a writer profoundly ambivalent about fiction. Of course, 
his suspicions about particular fictions are well-known?his attacks on the 
Newgate Novel are the foremost instance of this skepticism. As a critic for 
Fraser's in the 1830s and 1840s, he set out to demarcate clearly the line 
between storybooks and experience, or what he might have termed the 
artificial and the natural. It is not gratuitous that he objected to Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton as a hypocrite and as a bad writer, for?according to 
Thackeray?the criminal effects of a criminal romance proceed from the 
writer's self-conscious but unmarked imposition of a fiction on his readers. 
Sometimes, he found, Bulwer even imposed on himself.1 It is this stance 
towards fiction?exposer of the sham, champion of the real?that has been 
assigned to Thackeray by literary history. 
But such a categorization does justice neither to Thackeray's love for 
novels nor to his comprehensive notion of fiction?that is, his sense of its 
pervasiveness. His appreciation of the cognitive importance of fictions led 
him to inquire into their formal markings, on the one hand, and their uses and 
abuses, on the other, by indulging his penchant for parody. His major novels 
have often been discussed as investigations of the shifting relations among 
author, readers, and story?and as attempts to forge a moral bond between 
novelist and audience?but some of his minor texts offer strategic qualifica? 
tions of any "sense of an audience" too readily presumed.2 In Thackeray's 
early novel, The Memoirs of Barry Lyndon, Esq., the pleasures, hazards, and 
ubiquity of fiction are presented through a lively but thoroughly untrustworthy 
storyteller. By creating a speaker who tells a tale by not telling it, Thackeray 
explores the boundaries among fiction and belief, knowledge and power; in 
effect, the novel undermines as naive the common sense distinction between 
493 
This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:33:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
494 / FLETCHER 
truth and fiction, exposes the dangers of wholehearted belief in any language 
game, and offers fiction itself as the pedagogical tool par excellence for 
teaching the intricacies of interpretation. 
Thackeray's thoughts on fiction develop in response to a philosophical 
position represented most immediately for him by Thomas Carlyle. In "Biog? 
raphy," Carlyle invokes an ancient dichotomy between history and fiction, 
with history identified as the true, the real, and the route of access to the 
spiritual, and fiction condemned as harmful deceit: "'Fiction, while the 
feigner of it knows that he is feigning, partakes, more than we suspect, of the 
nature of lying-, and has ever an, in some degree, unsatisfactory character.'"3 
Conversely, the claim that historical narratives, such as biographies, are 
believable supports Carlyle's sense of wonder: 
Let any one bethink him how impressive the smallest historical/aci may 
become, as contrasted with the grandest fictitious event; what an incal? 
culable force lies for us in this consideration: The Thing which I here 
hold imaged in my mind did actually occur; was, in very truth, an 
element in the system of the All, whereof I too form a part; had therefore, 
and has, through all time, an authentic being; is not a dream, but a reality. 
(P. 54) 
With his trust that the historical narrative is more reliable than a fiction, 
Carlyle can endorse without hesitation a relation between belief and power on 
a cosmic level: "Belief is, indeed, the beginning and first condition of all 
spiritual Force whatsoever: only in so far as Imagination, were it but momen? 
tarily, is believed, can there be any use or meaning in it, any enjoyment of it? 
[sic]" (p. 50). Those who believed in mythological creatures, provided they 
believed sincerely (an important redundancy, which we shall find Thackeray 
questioning indirectly, through a fiction), were inspired by "spiritual Force," 
despite the counterfactual nature of mythological creatures. Myths are belat? 
edly fictional, but, when first in circulation, genuinely prophetic. Sincerity? 
what Carlyle terms "a loving Heart"?together with an attention to historical 
reality guarantee knowledge, turning "the whole man" into "a living mirror, 
wherein the wonders of this ever-wonderful Universe are, in their true light 
. . . represented, and reflected back on us" (p. 57). Throughout his career as 
novelist, Thackeray seems to be writing against this background of confidence 
in the factual (i.e. "real") story, looking at this problem of fictionality and 
belief from different angles but always with the responsible philosopher's 
objections in mind.4 Thackeray's responses, in the form officiions that force 
readers to test both the speaker's coherence as well as their own grounds for 
judgment, undermine the link in Western philosophy between representation 
and knowledge, the link reforged by Carlyle's metaphor for humanity, the 
"living mirror" that reflects the world.5 In every Thackerayan fiction, and in 
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every fiction in general (according to Thackeray), that mirror is warped, 
cracked, and beyond repair. 
The problem of fictionality has as its crux the question of whether or not, 
at any point, an audience believes in the fiction to which it has been exposed. 
While a certain line of criticism, descending from the Coleridge of the 
Shakespearean lectures, would have it that the audience suspends its disbelief 
when attending to a fiction in its desire to see through the performance to 
reality, an equally important faction has held that the audience always has 
clearly in mind the fictionality of novel or drama.6 Thackeray's bent was 
skeptical, away from belief in fictions and away from the Carlylean trust in 
belief, towards a sort of "ironic reception" theory. At the very least, he began 
his career with a notion that belief is not essential to the appreciation of 
fictions, though he himself often succumbed to the "charm" afforded by 
Dickens and others.7 As his career progressed, however, and his skepticism 
was confirmed, his insistence on the groundlessness of belief gave way to an 
understanding of the consequent prevalence of fictions.8 
Barry Lyndon asks us to consider in detail the consequences of that 
engagement with fiction, from the perspective of both the fictionalizer and his 
audience. It presents an engaging story which, through its narrator's inconsis? 
tency, keeps the reader off-balance regarding what is false and true, and in fact 
thematizes this pragmatic problem of distinguishing and establishing the 
legitimate in a world of pretenders. In so doing, it makes a case that the play 
of fiction is quite serious, for not only does fiction help explain the dangers 
of belief, as Thackeray saw them, it also exposes the processes whereby those 
beliefs can be validated as knowledge. 
Barry Lyndon is a fairly complex narrator; he brags with the hyperbole 
of a teller of tall-tales, but he also purposely keeps silent, naively admits his 
miscalculations, moralizes on man's inhumanity, argues for realism in novels, 
sentimentalizes over his home and mother, and even frankly admits to 
dishonesty or unscrupulousness, justifying himself through necessity.9 It 
becomes the book's challenge to the reader to sort as many of these narrative 
"speech acts" as he or she can by checking them against the "facts" of the 
narrative. The fictionalization of this speaker's "experience" becomes appar? 
ent, then, through the accumulation of his discrepancies, inconsistencies, 
inadvertant revelations, and moments of obtuseness, to name just a few of the 
mechanisms. In this novel, Thackeray makes a case that fictionalization is 
both a cognitive and cultural phenomenon which literary texts can enact and 
exemplify. 
The novel works through the combination of two elements that have been 
cited by critics throughout the history of its reception: the immorality readily 
apparent in the narrator's discourse and the nonetheless seductive pull of its 
seeming candor. James Fitzjames Stephen and Anthony Trollope both identify 
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what makes Barry Lyndon unusual as a fiction and yet exemplary of the way 
fictions work. Stephen explains the mechanism of the text?which depends 
for its effect on what a narratologist might call the coincidence of focalizer and 
point of view?as well as his own ambivalent reaction to its creation, Barry 
Lyndon: 
To be able, with perfect decency and propriety, to take up his abode in 
the very heart of a most unmitigated blackguard and scoundrel, and to 
show how, as a matter of course, and without any kind of denial or 
concealment, he bon?fide considers himself one of the best and greatest 
of men, is surely one of the hardest tasks which could be imposed on an 
author; yet Mr. Thackeray has undertaken and executed it with perfect 
success . . . The conception of Barry Lyndon's character involves, 
however, some grains of good... He is almost heartbroken at his [son's] 
death, and, in his lowest degradation, wears a lock of his hair round his 
neck. There is something not only touching, but deeply true, in such a 
representation.10 
Trollope is more direct: 
Barry Lyndon is as great a scoundrel as the mind of man ever conceived 
. . . And yet his story is so written that it is almost impossible not to 
entertain something of a friendly feeling for him . . . the reader is so 
carried away by his frankness and energy as almost to rejoice when he 
succeeds, and to grieve with him when he is brought to the ground.11 
Both reviewers are very clear that we, as readers, are not supposed to trust 
Barry, and yet both also feel engaged with the cooperative principle in 
narrative to such a degree that they respond emotionally to something "deeply 
true" in Barry's representation of his life. Trollope and Stephen are instructive 
in their responses because they express the inconsistency of interpretation 
Thackeray meant to elicit and thematize: neither believes the character Barry 
Lyndon attributes to himself, yet both believe in the character and in some of 
what he says. The charm registered by both critics in response to Barry's 
"frankness" provides another example of Thackeray's insights into the rela? 
tion between fiction and belief, insights which challenge Carlylean faith.12 
In this novel, Thackeray has exemplified and dramatized the cooperative 
principle in narrative and how that pragmatic need to "listen" empowers 
fiction.13 The merging of "who is seeing" and "who is speaking" in this fiction 
provides it with the same narrative mode as that of autobiography, and?like 
many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels hoping to blur the line 
between history and fiction?Barry Lyndon is labeled as a non-fictional life 
narrative, a memoir.14 This claim to narrate a life and the consequent trust of 
the reader in the narrator's competence is, however, immediately compro? 
mised when, to begin his narrative, Barry makes an assertion wildly misogy 
nistic and hyperbolic: "Since the days of Adam, there has been hardly a 
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mischief done in this world but a woman has been at the bottom of it."15 The 
reader is given two uncomplementary tasks as he or she begins the novel: to 
listen seriously to the events described and explained by the narrator?in 
Smith's words, "to infer the motives and circumstances that occasioned his 
utterance"?and to double check those explanations against the descriptions, 
as well as any other descriptions available to him or her.16 This first-person 
narrative will stretch the cooperative principle and thus highlight the game 
someness of fiction. But the complexity of Barry's voice and his willingness 
to present other voices in his text will also highlight the "inferential walks" 
that are part of the game, for the point of Barry Lyndon is not only the 
fictionality of the narrative but also the processes by which narrative neces? 
sarily fictionalizes to some degree.17 Barry's story posits, of course, a series 
of events, linked by cause and effect or by fortune and luck, that add up to a 
life. But Thackeray 
' s novel, through the inconsistency of its narrator, demands 
that the reader separate event from description of the event, as well as from 
narrative of the event, explanation for the event, and justification of the 
explanation.18 At every step of this process, the potential for fictionalization 
enters; indeed, the inferential nature of the process guarantees that even the 
most veracious witness to an event creates a fiction, in the sense of a 
hypothesis (or a series of them). Our desire to listen to Barry and our almost 
immediate distrust of him combine to force us to try to recognize every level 
of the text, every voice in it, and the possibility of alternative hypotheses? 
inferences or stories?at each of the levels.19 In effect, the reader of Barry 
Lyndon must become a writer, creating another fiction or two "truer" than the 
original, perhaps, only in their coherence.20 
Barry's retrospective of his early experiences begins immediately to 
construct his inconsistency as both character and speaker. With his profligate 
father dead and his widowed mother dedicated to rewriting the character of her 
husband, Redmond Barry, as Barry Lyndon is called when he begins life, 
grows up in the household of his uncle and cousins as the poor but proud 
relation of a family of shabby gentry. Simultaneously contemptuous of idle 
claims to nobility and full of the glories of the "Barrys of Barryogue," the 
young Barry and the adult narrator puncture the pretensions of this society 
(including his cousins) but fail to reflect on their own myths of identity. The 
reader is thus caught in a position he or she will occupy frequently, crediting 
the outsider's view of the society provided by Barry and yet supplementing 
Barry's understanding of himself and his part in the world. Barry's irony, both 
in the story and its retrospective frame, is fairly limited to his view of others 
and the world at large and is rarely self-reflexive. 
This character/narrator, then, puts us in the awkward position of listening 
to his story but second-guessing it relentlessly. He offers as a formative 
experience his romance with his cousin Nora, subsequent rejection in favor of 
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an English captain with money, and successful revenge through a duel. By 
exploiting the techniques of first-person narrative, however, Thackeray turns 
the "experience" into an examination of the distance between event and 
explanation. Barry's reader must, at the least, take his word for it that 
something happened involving him and his cousin, certain events that he has 
structured as his first affair of the heart. But, his characteristic braggadocio and 
retrospective misogyny predispose the reader to fill out certain nascent 
narratives suggested by his own: 
I was a more accomplished man than either of my cousins; and I think 
Nature had been also, more bountiful to me in the matter of person. Some 
of the Castle Brady girls (as you shall hear presently) adored me. At fairs 
and races many of the prettiest lasses present said they would like to 
have me for their bachelor, and yet somehow, it must be confessed, I was 
not popular. (P. 16) 
Adored and yet not popular, proud of his "deeds of prowess" and yet eager to 
dismiss the subject of his losing efforts in boyhood fights with the claim that 
"fisticuff-facts are dull subjects to talk of, and to discuss before high-bred 
gentlemen and ladies" (p. 17), Barry presents two narratives in one, the buried 
version left to the reader to infer against that provided by his storyteller. So 
it is, too, with his infatuation for Nora. He sets up the story with a backward 
glance at her appearance, a glance which?like the generalizations on the 
foolishness of first love that precede the episode?tempers the adult Barry's 
necessary admission that "in my first affair I was wofully unsuccessful" 
(p. 19): 
When I come to think about her now, I know she never could have been 
handsome; for her figure was rather of the fattest, and her mouth of the 
widest; she was freckled over like a partridge's egg, and her hair was the 
colour of a certain vegetable which we eat with boiled beef, to use the 
mildest term. (P. 22) 
Wrapped up in the mixed signals about his popularity, Barry's story of Nora 
rewrites itself as he proceeds. He undercuts his own love story, telling us that 
Nora was a flirt?far from adoring her cousin, she really only uses him "to 
rehearse her accomplishment upon" (p. 22)?but failing to recognize his own 
foolishness as a boy, which remains to him, instead, the great but undeveloped 
passion of a future hero: 
"For after all, Redmond," she would say, "you are but fifteen, and you 
hav'n't a guinea in the world;" at which I would swear that I would 
become the greatest hero ever known out of Ireland, and vow that before 
I was twenty I would have money enough to purchase an estate six times 
as big as Castle Brady. All which vain promises, of course, I did not 
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keep; but I make no doubt they influenced me in my very early life, and 
caused me to do those great actions for which I have been celebrated, and 
which shall be narrated presently in order. (P. 24) 
Barry is quite ready to see his life as a coherent whole, tied together by 
causation when he thinks his actions reflect well on him, by luck when he 
thinks things could have gone better. In his version of this episode, Nora jilts 
him for Captain Quin, an Englishman, whom young Redmond Barry then 
insults (by flinging a glass of wine in his face) and challenges to a duel. The 
older Barry can sometimes laugh at his younger self's hot-headedness?so 
long as he glosses it as the "spirit" belonging to a gentleman?as when he 
bursts out in advance of his engagement with Quin: 
"I'll have his blood, or he shall have mine; and this riband shall be found 
dyed in it... Yes! and if I kill him, I'll pin it on his breast, and then she 
may go take back her token." This I said because I was very much excited 
at the time, and because I had not read my novels and romantic plays for 
nothing. (P. 40) 
But when he describes the results of the duel, he presents his feelings as they 
were at the time, leaving any ironic hindsight out and thus validating his 
boyhood sense of grandeur: "I did not feel any horror or fear, young as I was, 
in seeing my enemy prostrate before me; for I knew that I had met and 
conquered him honourably in the field, as became a man of my name and 
blood" (p. 47). What Barry doesn't tell us here is that Quin has survived the 
duel because it has been fixed; as we find out two chapters later (p. 65), Barry 
' s 
older male cousins and another officer, Captain Fagan, have loaded his pistol 
with a plug of tow, a sort of blank, rendering it harmless. Of course, Barry 
Lyndon knows this as he narrates, but young Redmond Barry's heroism would 
be compromised if the story of the duel were rewritten at this point, so he 
carefully elides this development, to keep his fiction of development intact. 
If the reader has been careful, however, he or she has come upon 
rudimentary narratives which have been "narcotized" in the narrator's dis? 
course?narratives which may nevertheless counter Barry's blown-up ro? 
mance if they are revived in the reader's imagination.21 To trace Nora's story 
is to find a flirtatious girl who spots her cousin's boorishness very early (p. 23), 
discourages him good-humoredly from taking his suit for her seriously (pp. 
25-6), and is matched (for her family's advantage) with an equally boorish 
English captain (p. 33).22 When Barry bursts upon the pair and threatens to 
attack Quin and the latter reaches for his sword, Nora finds herself between 
two melodramatic boys: 
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"Captain Quin, for Heaven's sake spare the child?he is but an 
infant!" 
"And ought to be whipped for his impudence," said the captain; 
"but never fear, Miss Brady, I shall not touch him; your favourite is safe 
from me... When ladies make presents to gentlemen, it is time for other 
gentlemen to retire." 
"Good heavens, Quin!" cried the girl, "he is but a boy." 
"I'm a man," roared I, "and will prove it." 
"And don't signify any more than my parrot or lap-dog. Mayn't I 
give a bit of riband to my own cousin?" (P. 32) 
Nora's voice asserts, within Barry Lyndon's memoir, what a minor character 
young Redmond Barry was. The arranged marriage is threatened, however, by 
his obstreperousness, and when Quin and Nora's brothers are about to fall to 
over Quin's attempted withdrawl, Fagan, the wily brother officer, encourages 
Redmond to attack again, in order to defuse the situation. The engagement is 
thus preserved and, after Redmond is sent home, even cemented. As Barry tells 
us, when he finds out eventually about the clandestine marriage he grabs 
center-stage again by tossing the wine in Quin's face and proposing the 
meeting between them: 
"Mr. Quin," said I, in the most dignified tone I could assume, "may also 
have satisfaction any time he pleases, by calling on Redmond Barry, 
Esquire, of Barry ville." At which speech my uncle burst out a-laughing 
(as he did at everything); and in this laugh, Captain Fagan, much to my 
mortification, joined. (P. 38) 
Barry, in retrospect, still cannot find anything ridiculous in his boyhood 
bravado and thus cannot understand the laughter. What is in Barry's story the 
highly serious end to a fatal attraction is in the alternative story (and the novel 
as a whole) a comedy; when Barry arrives at the site appointed for the duel, 
he finds that "the party were laughing together at some joke of one or the other, 
and I must say I thought this laughter very unbecoming in my cousins, who 
were met, perhaps, to see the death of one of their kindred" (p. 45). Once again, 
Barry's fiction overtly narcotizes the farcical element of the events (this 
laughter is, of course, an early clue that the duel is a fake), but his represen? 
tation nonetheless contains the makings of another story. 
The vagaries of narrative and its resulting fictiveness form the ultimate 
subject of this episode in all its variations. Barry narcotizes the voices that 
would interpret the events differently?even the voice of a wiser self that is 
supposed to result from experience. On the other hand, he blows up the 
importance of some events?most notably, Nora's flirtations?in line with his 
own sense of himself as ill-used gentleman. The resulting story is, of course, 
only half the story, a half that has been made significant for Barry by fitting 
his experience into a formula we might entitle the rhetoric of the jilted 
This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:33:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
MEMOIRS OF BARRY LYNDON / 501 
romantic hero.23 The narcotized elements of this narrative, however, provide 
the building blocks of alternative interpretations for the events Barry tries to 
restrict to his own story. These fragments call attention to themselves, as we 
have seen, precisely because they don't fit Barry's schema for himself; it turns 
out that they repay, instead, the reader's "inferential walks," or forecasts of the 
future course of the story, which they highlight. They allow him or her to 
construct "ghost chapters" (Eco, pp. 214-15), such as the conspiracy to fix the 
duel, and these phantom fictions cumulatively empower the reader to place 
Barry back on the periphery of the action, against his will. Barry's desire to 
center events around himself, to tell his story rather than others' stories, 
repeats the gesture of autobiography or the historical text by framing (and thus 
fictionalizing) events around a subject. 
Our faith in Barry's competence as a narrator of his own experience is 
virtually shattered, then, very early on in the book; yet, we find ourselves 
continuing to listen to this voice, as well as the voices that come through his? 
clairvoyantly, one might say. The focalization of the narrative and the 
cooperative principle that is entailed by it demand that the reader attend to 
Barry's characterizations, unless he or she detects a discrepancy, stops reading 
the novel, or decides to play his or her own game with the text, a la Barry 
himself. Much in Barry's story of his early romance remains believable, for 
lack of falsification. His portrayal of Quin as a coward, for instance, finds 
corroboration in the words of Fagan, the Brady brothers, and even Nora 
herself. Thackeray thus continually challenges the reader's inferential skills, 
demonstrating that belief in narrative is no simple matter of choice. Believe 
we may (or may not), but agree upon, at the least, we must. 
Barry's narration of his military experiences reflects his inconsistency as 
a storyteller and, hence also, the reader's inconsistent trust in him. After 
leaving his village because of his "deadly" encounter with Quin, Barry tries 
to make a start in the "genteel world" by posing as a wealthy young gentleman, 
only to be fleeced by two similarly-minded con artists. To make his way he 
decides he must "accept his Majesty's shilling" (p. 62) and enter the army, 
where he bemoans the situation his luck has placed him in: 
Pah! the reminiscences of the horrid black-hole of a place in which we 
soldiers were confined, of the wretched creatures with whom I was now 
forced to keep company, of the ploughmen, poachers, pickpockets, who 
had taken refuge from poverty, or the law, as, in truth, I had done myself, 
is enough to make me ashamed even now, and it calls the blush into my 
old cheeks to think I was ever forced to keep such company. (P. 62) 
Barry's irrepressible pride sustains him, however, and he sees action in the 
Seven Years' War as a corporal. Thackeray thus places his young rogue in 
circumstances that permit him to give a footman's view of the war, with his 
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usual "frankness." Barry's confusion over the various shifting alliances?"It 
would require a greater philosopher and historian than I am to explain the 
causes of the famous Seven Years' War in which Europe was engaged" (p. 
67)?reduces the complicated, political explanations for the war to the sort of 
personal power struggle he is familiar with: "Now, somehow, we were on 
Frederick's side." His scenario thereby also debunks "'the Protestant hero,' as 
we used to call the godless old Frederick of Prussia," as a fiction of historians 
and deglorifies the war as well. 
We listen attentively to Barry at this point, I would argue, for several 
reasons. First, his admission of his low station, however undeserved he thinks 
it, again narcotizes, for the time being, our sense of his bragging, which has 
up till this point strained our credulity. Second, given our disposition to take 
inferential walks when interpreting a narrative, regardless of its type, this 
outsider's view of political history enlists the reader's desire to revise the 
conventional, general narrative of the war by filling in the motivations of the 
various characters involved: Frederick, Maria of Austria, George II of En? 
gland, and others. Finally, we simply have no other voice than Barry's here; 
his focalization temporarily overlaps with the teleology of the novel, provid? 
ing through the corrective of his underling's perspective another example of 
the prevalence of fictions?this time, those to be found in history books. 
Here then is evidence of the persuasiveness of the storyteller's testimony, 
especially when he offers it as alternative to received opinion. Barry makes a 
point of deromanticizing (and thus increasing the believability of) his own 
military experience through comparison: 
Were these memoirs not characterized by truth, and did I deign to utter 
a single word for which my own personal experience did not give me the 
fullest authority, I might easily make myself the hero of some strange 
and popular adventures, and, after the fashion of novel-writers, intro? 
duce my readers to the great characters of this remarkable time. These 
persons (I mean the romance-writers), if they take a drummer or a 
dustman for a hero, somehow manage to bring him in contact with the 
greatest lords and most notorious personages of the empire, and I 
warrant me there's not one of them but, in describing the battle of 
Minden would manage to bring Prince Ferdinand, and my Lord George 
Sackville, and my Lord Granby into presence. (Pp. 69-70) 
Barry is, of course, quite capable of turning romance-writer when he has a 
mind to, as we saw him do in his tale of first love and as he will throughout 
his memoir. But, in this instance, Thackeray uses his inconsistent narrator as 
a leveller whose brutality rides roughshod over the glosses of battle-field 
honor found in the military novels: 
I saw, I promise you, some very good company on the French part, for 
their regiments of Lorraine and Royal Cravate were charging us all day; 
and in that sort of m?l?e high and low are pretty equally received. I hate 
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bragging, but I cannot help saying that I made a very close acquaintance 
with the colonel of the Cravates, for I drove my bayonet into his body, 
and finished off a poor little ensign, so young, slender, and small, that 
a blow from my pig-tail would have dispatched him, I think, in place of 
the butt of my musket, with which I clubbed him down. I killed, besides, 
four more officers and men, and in the poor ensign's pocket found a 
purse of fourteen louis-d'or, and a silver box of sugar-plums, of which 
the former present was very agreeable to me. If people would tell their 
stories of battles in this simple way, I think the cause of truth would not 
suffer by it. All I know of this famous fight of Minden (except from 
books) is told here above. (P. 70) 
Critics have found these comments out of character, but the coherence of 
character is a fiction that this novel is, in fact, out to challenge.24 Barry is 
indeed an incoherent character, for he is rarely self-aware, and the checks 
people impose on themselves which stabilize the self and inhibit what they say 
are largely (though not entirely) absent from his voice. Recalling his discovery 
of the dead Fagan on the battlefield, stripped of his valuables, Barry moralizes 
upon the rapacity of those who would rob a body while retreating and the 
hypocrisy of the politicians who lead them: 
Such knaves and ruffians do men in war become ! It is well for gentlemen 
to talk of the age of chivalry; but remember the starving brutes whom 
they lead?men nursed in poverty, entirely ignorant, made to take a 
pride in deeds of blood?men who can have no amusement but in 
drunkenness, debauch, and plunder. It is with these shocking instru? 
ments that your great warriors and kings have been doing their murder? 
ous work in the world. (P. 71) 
Not only does Barry fail to apply the moral to himself, as illustration of the 
murder and rape that Frederick's "philosophy, and his liberality" produce, he 
casually adds one more story, in which he prominently figures: 
I can recollect a certain day, about three weeks after the battle of 
Minden, and a farm-house in which some of us entered; and how the old 
woman and her daughters served us, trembling to wine; and how we got 
drunk over the wine, and the house was in a flame, presently: and woe 
betide the wretched fellow afterwards who came home to look for his 
house and his children! (P. 71) 
The spontaneous combustion Barry's grammar provides?"the house was in 
a flame, presently"?elides (or attempts to, at least) the responsibility he 
begins to lay upon himself and his fellows. Like so much of his narrative, 
Barry's example implicates his own actions, not only those he intends to 
criticize.25 The hypocrisies made possible through the fictionality of explana? 
tions extend, he inadvertently shows us, to both high and low, general and 
corporal, narrator and character. 
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These early episodes of boyhood infatuation and the military life set the 
tone for the novel as a whole and also establish the reader's task: to understand 
the narrative and its narrator, to join in his game, without being fooled? 
without, that is, missing the fact that he violates the rules more than occasion? 
ally. Barry's commitment to his own story makes this interpretive play a 
struggle at times; indeed, this fiction about fiction-making aims to character? 
ize the writing and reading of fiction as a form of agonistics, where writer and 
reader play for the advantage over or persuasion of the other. Barry's belief 
is a function simultaneously of his self-creation through storytelling and the 
self-deception which that "fictionalizing" reflects and reinforces.26 Barry's 
changing names and guises may signal to the reader that the voice of Barry 
Lyndon breaks down, once he or she unravels the unity imposed by the 
reminiscing narrator, into a number of voices or perspectives, some reliable 
in their reporting, some not.27 Through them all, however?from the boy who 
believes his cousin adores him, to the old, broken-down prisoner who believes 
luck and not his actions has determined his fate?runs that strain of frankness 
Trollope identified, a sincere faith Barry has in himself, which he is convinced 
the reader will share. 
That the novel leads us to question that faith and rewrite Barry's story 
reflects Thackeray's own doubts about the value of belief in fictions. From the 
novelist's perspective, we are in trouble if, as Carlyle insists, belief is to be the 
criterion with which to judge the worth of a text. Carlyle claims that we believe 
only in the serious or the responsible, not the ironic, flippant, or the 
make-believe, but our interpretive situation allows for the irresponsible to 
pass for the responsible, fictions for facts. There is no clear semantic differ? 
ence between these categories of discourse, only a pragmatic one which the 
fiction writer or the rogue can exploit.28 Barry Lyndon plays upon the 
fragmentary moments of assent that occur in the game of make-believe in 
order to reframe the issue of the fiction's and reader's responsibility. In 
opposition to Carlyle's sermons of conviction and serious representation, 
Thackeray presents a playful education in interpretation through a fiction 
which rewards disbelief in what its narrator pretends to represent. Responsi? 
bility is, for Thackeray, a matter of reading, not of discourse analysis. 
But disbelief in a fiction (or even a series of them) is not the same as 
disbelief in fiction. Where Carlyle argues that we must abandon the fictional 
for the real, Thackeray reveals that criticism is generated, and perspective on 
self and culture gained, only through appeal to other stories, or to the textual 
indications of their narcotized presence. Too firm a belief in the reality beyond 
the story, without the frequent checks other stories supply, can land one in the 
predicament of Barry Lyndon, creating ad hoc fictions without realizing it. In 
forcing his reader to deal with Barry Lyndon, Thackeray sought to train him 
or her to recognize the intertextuality of experience and to handle competently 
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the shifting language games of human society. Like Carlyle, Thackeray 
worried about irresponsible discourse, but?feeling that historical and fic? 
tional discourse refer to their objects in the same way?he tried in this novel 
to show that fictions are detected and understood through other fictions.29 In 
fact, this practice in formulating alternative hypotheses and other readings? 
thus changing the rules of the game?is the most beneficial thing fiction can 
provide. And it is what Barry Lyndon refigures through the strategies and 
tactics of its narrator and his opponents. 
The act of reading a novel seems to carry with it few dire consequences 
for the reader?beyond wasting time?but Thackeray wishes to indicate in his 
novel that fictions do indeed have serious repercussions for human experi? 
ence. The smart reader (or informed reader or ideal reader or any other such 
entity) may have kept his or her distance from Barry's narrative by picking up 
on all the signals of its frequent unreliability. Perhaps he or she has found the 
narrator a bit obtuse and, being especially perspicacious, has distrusted any 
judgment, assertion, or even description offered. However, through the power 
of the story, its representation of events that are perhaps only possible, 
Thackeray ensures that the dangers of belief in fiction get dramatized. The 
reader may think that Barry's stories will get him nowhere, but the narrative 
insists that our hero does find his audience eventually. Uncontradicted by 
other voices in the novel, Barry's rise to power through his machinations and 
eventual marriage to Lady Honoria Lyndon drive home to the reader the 
possibility of success for even the most obvious of storytellers as well as the 
gullibility of the world at large for fictions. Lady Lyndon?who, like the 
reader willing to play along for the fun of the tale, "listens" to Barry for too 
long?stands-in, as it were, for that reader. The reader may vicariously 
"experience" this rogue through the text, but, in the text, Lady Lyndon pays 
the price for her game.30 
After employing masquerades to escape from service in two different 
armies, and after taking up a gambler's life with his long-lost uncle?a life in 
which his bluffs are backed up by his sword?Barry decides to pursue the 
widow of an English lord who had shown in his last days a fascination (akin 
to Trollope' s) for the Irishman's effrontery. Barry picks Lady Lyndon because 
she also indulges in elaborate stories, though without the sort of calculation 
involved which Barry is guilty of here. Thackeray makes her a woman too 
saturated with fashionable novels, too ready to engage in fictions of romance, 
for her own good. While her elderly first husband lived, she carried on 
innocent intrigues through letters with Barry and other gallants, and Barry 
later takes advantage of her desire for such frivolity and play by showing his 
letters from her to her cousin, Lord George Poynings, thus guaranteeing the 
latter's retreat: 
This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:33:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
506 / FLETCHER 
"My wife," said the little lord, "shall write no sonnets or billets-doux, 
and I'm heartily glad to think I have obtained, in good time, a knowledge 
of the heartless vixen with whom I thought myself for a moment in love." 
The wounded young nobleman was either, as I have said, very 
young and green in matters of the world?for to suppose that a man 
would give up forty thousand a year because, forsooth, the lady con? 
nected with it had written a few sentimental letters to a young fellow, is 
too absurd; or, as I am inclined to believe, he was glad of an excuse to 
quit the field altogether, being by no means anxious to meet the 
victorious sword of Redmond Barry a second time. (P. 214) 
Barry can understand Lady Lyndon's harmless make-believe but cannot 
fathom Poyning's objections to it; he is, of course, more worldly than the 
young nobleman and?like so many of Thackeray's ambitious upstarts?has 
a quite thorough appreciation for the social weight of fictions and less of an 
overriding fiction of honesty of his own to abide by. When Lady Lyndon 
rejects his advances, having herself finished with the game, Barry poses as the 
Byronic lover and shows her that quitting the masquerade is not always a 
voluntary matter: 
"These have passed, madam," said I,?"Calista's letters to Eugenio. 
They may have been very innocent, but will the world believe it? You 
may have only intended to play with the heart of the poor artless Irish 
gentleman who adored and confided in you. But who will believe the 
stories of your innocence against the irrefragable testimony of your own 
handwriting? Who will believe that you could write these letters in the 
mere wantonness of coquetry, and not under the influence of affection?" 
"Villain!" cried my Lady Lyndon, "could you dare to construe out 
of those idle letters of mine any other meaning than that which they 
really bear?" 
"I will construe anything out of them," said I, "such is the passion 
which animates me towards you." (Pp. 216-17) 
The danger of textual games is that they are subject to interpretation, to a 
change in the way they are used. Barry has switched the mode of play from 
Pastoral to Gothic, and he continues to play the villain: "Terror, be sure of 
that," he tells us, "is not a bad ingredient of love" (p. 218). Lady Lyndon finds 
herself cooperating, writing of Barry in the style of a Gothic heroine: "'The 
horrid look of his black serpent-like eyes fascinates and frightens me; it seems 
to follow me everywhere, and even when I close my eyes, the dreadful gaze 
penetrates the lids, and is still upon me. 
' 
When a woman begins to talk of a man 
in this way," Barry boasts, "he is an ass who does not win her" (p. 220). She 
becomes Barry's audience without realizing it, "listening," along with the 
reader, and "believing" the fiction. 
With the skills of a strategist for a modern political campaign, Barry 
spreads a "story of her ladyship's passionate attachment for me" (p. 228), 
thereby transposing what was a private game into the social world: 
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Every one thought I was well with the widowed countess, though no one 
could show that I said so. But there is a way of proving a thing even while 
you contradict it, and I used to laugh and joke so ? propos that all men 
began to wish me joy of my great fortune, and look up to me as the 
affianced husband of the greatest heiress in the kingdom. The papers 
took up the matter. (P. 228) 
Barry's mastery at manipulating gossip demonstrates how readily belief is 
socially validated as knowledge. As rumors are legitimized, so categories and 
narratives are reified through tacit social agreement.31 Barry's triumphant 
arrangement of his marriage to Lady Lyndon implies that the basis of culture 
is not so much an immediately available real world as it is a combination of 
fictions and power. Barry demonstrates enough competence or know-how (or 
"savoir-faire," according to Lyotard [p. 21]) with the social world to "earn" 
success and hence the legitimacy he has claimed all along. 
The consequences of Barry's grand stake are paid by Lady Lyndon, after 
she succumbs and marries her Byronic lover. The remainder of his story tells 
of the struggles of his wife to escape his abuse, while he imagines it to 
exemplify the turn of "Fate" against him. Lady Lyndon quickly finds out what 
her husband is really like, and, in describing their honeymoon, Barry lets the 
reader know as well, through euphemistic glosses: "Lady Lyndon was a 
haughty woman, and I hate pride, and I promise you that in both instances [of 
her objecting to his actions] I overcame this vice in her" (p. 235). He soon 
begins to confine her, isolating her from family and friends and hoping thus 
to find a way of securing her fortune for their child, while disinheriting her first 
son from her previous marriage. With the help of that son and her cousin Lord 
Poynings, Lady Lyndon escapes eventually from Barry's clutches, and he 
ends, years later, in prison, with only his faithful mother to watch over him. 
But the misery that the bully inflicts on the foolish woman serves as a warning 
to the reader who thinks fictions are inconsequential. Lady Lyndon's predica? 
ment serves as a sort of mise en abyme for the reader's engagement with the 
text, her vicarious play with Barry mirroring the naive reader's vicarious 
experience through Barry's story?in both cases the amateur being duped by 
the professional player.32 We are thus implicated in the consequences that 
Barry's fictions about himself (and other such fictions operating in the society 
around us) have for others without having to suffer them ourselves. We learn 
to recognize the game without having the penalties for playing enforced. 
Even more importantly, Barry himself also stands in for his reader, for 
Barry is his own best audience. As The Book of Snobs makes clear, Thackeray 
understood the self to be a social dyad, and so we should expect to find his 
fictionalizer as much a product of the fictions around him as he is a producer 
and promulgator of them. Indeed, from the novel's first page until its hero's 
last words?his description of a final "miserable existence, quite unworthy of 
the famous and fashionable Barry Lyndon" (p. 307)?Barry remains con 
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vinced of the stories of his family's nobility and distinction first instilled in 
him by his self-righteous mother (pp. 6-7). From that vantage point, he is quite 
good at puncturing the pretenses of genteel society?whether they be those of 
his cousins, the Bradys, or his wife's relations, Lord and Lady Tiptoff (p. 254). 
Yet Barry 
' s belief in his fictitious heritage is part of his greatest weakness, 
his adoption of the values and habits of that fictional creature, the "man of 
quality" (p. 233).33 Once he attains his position "as an ornament of English 
society" (p. 234), he immediately starts to spend money wildly, cutting down 
the forests on the Lyndon estate, hiring a French decorator?who "in his rage 
for improvement . . . dared anything" (p. 239)?to transform, among other 
things, his bedroom, "after the exact fashion of the Queen's closet at 
Versailles" (p. 238). He goes through his wife's fortune in no time (the 
swindler being swindled in turn when he tries to invest or gamble), and has to 
borrow money to support his extravagancies. In all things, Barry follows "the 
practice of the world" (p. 143), and so his fortunate rise becomes an unlucky 
fall. Through much of the novel, he can spot the impostor in others, but he fools 
himself into believing his own fictions of his "natural station" (p. 127) in 
society. His indiscretions with the money and land turn the people against him 
and help to forge the alliance among his stepson, Lord Poynings, and his own 
secretary, the son of Quin and Nora; yet, once on top, Barry feels himself 
invincible, and the strategic daring with which he grabbed his place dissipates 
into careless tyranny. The fictions that won him his marriage and name deprive 
him of it as well, once he acts up to the part.34 
Convinced of his own stories and convicted by them, Barry Lyndon 
illustrates, for Thackeray, the pervasiveness of fictions: their social ubiquity 
and even psychological necessity. Barry must, in effect, keep up the swagger, 
or he would self-destruct, so important to him is it that he be the successful 
character he imagines himself. When he drops the mask for a second, we are 
shown the confusion that would result if his fictions of himself were discred? 
ited: 
The fact is, between my respected reader and myself, that I was one of 
the handsomest and most dashing young men of England in those days, 
and my wife was violently in love with me; and though I say it who 
shouldn't, as the phrase goes, my wife was not the only woman of rank 
in London who had a favourable opinion of the humble Irish adventurer. 
What a riddle these women are, I have often thought! I have seen the 
most elegant creatures at St. James's grow wild for love of the coarsest 
and most vulgar of men; the cleverest women passionately admire the 
most illiterate of our sex, and so on. There is no end to the contrariety 
in the foolish creatures; and though I don't mean to hint that / am vulgar 
or illiterate, as the persons mentioned above (I would cut the throat of 
any man who dared to whisper a word against my birth or my breeding), 
yet I have shown that Lady Lyndon had plenty of reason to dislike me 
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if she chose; but, like the rest of her silly sex, she was governed by 
infatuation, not reason. (Pp. 256-57) 
A narrative moment of insecurity such as this one, along with other naive 
revelations, might just sway the reader to appreciate that "frankness" noted by 
the novel's first critics. Again, James Fitzjames Stephen's previously cited 
response to Barry contains something of the emotion and self-deception of 
Barry's narrative. If Barry contradicts himself, revealing his sense of himself 
as a "humble Irish adventurer" while insisting that he is not "vulgar," Stephen 
creates "a most unmitigated blackguard and scoundrel" who has "some grains 
of good" in him. Stephen finds Barry's reaction to the death of his son 
"touching" and "deeply true," and this is the reaction Barry himself solicits. 
If we investigate young Bryan Lyndon's death, though, we find a father who 
irresponsibly encourages his son in the act of disobedience that results in his 
death from a fall off his new pony: 
"Promise me, Bryan," screamed his mother, "that you will not ride the 
horse except in company of your father." But I only said, "Pooh, madam, 
you are an ass!" being angry at her silly timidity, which was always 
showing itself in a thousand disagreeable ways now; and, turning round 
to Bryan, said, "I promise your lordship a good flogging if you mount 
him without my leave." 
I suppose the poor child did not care about paying this penalty for 
the pleasure he was to have, or possibly thought a fond father would 
remit the punishment altogether. (P. 282) 
Barry never understands his culpability here, so insulated is he by his good 
sense of himself. And Stephen is fooled as well, for he "listens" to Barry's 
affecting description of the scene and misses the irony of Barry's stupid 
indulgence of the boy and its justification on the grounds of emotion. There 
is indeed something "deeply true" about the scene, as well as about Stephen's 
conscripted response, for both narrator and critic are so involved in the fiction 
as to blind themselves to their own responses.35 The fictions through which the 
self is constructed and validated can be so powerful as to make criticism 
impossible. And yet, to abandon those stories and become "objective" is 
equally impossible. What we are left with is the necessity of self-deception, 
for either self-creation or the creation of an "objective" world (textual or 
experiential). Barry Lyndon's inconsistent fictional life (within the fiction of 
his life called Barry Lyndon) dramatizes the potential unreliability of the 
fictions we ourselves live by. 
WEST CHESTER UNIVERSITY 
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1 Gordon Ray, Thackeray, 2 vols. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill, 1955, 
1958), 1:241-43. 
2 See Janice Carlisle, The Sense of an Audience (Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1981). 
There has been a healthy interest, in recent years, in the relations between Victorian 
writers, readers, and the novel's form. For two more such reader-response approaches to 
Thackeray, see Michael Lund, Reading Thackeray (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 
1988), and Robyn R. Warhol, Gendered Interventions: Narrative Discourse in the 
Victorian Novel (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 83-100. The work of 
Wolfgang Iser, of course, initiated this trend. See Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of 
Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 1974). 
3 Thomas Carlyle, "Biography," Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, in 5 vols. (London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1920), 3:44-61,49. Further references will appear in the text. When one 
considers the etymological link between "fiction" and "feigning," Carlyle's assertion here 
comes off as strategically redundant and quite emphatic. For a brief explanation of that 
link and the history of the word "fiction" in English, see Raymond Williams, Keywords: 
A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 111-13. 
4 For a detailed examination of the complex relationship between the two writers, see 
Charles Richard Sanders, "The Carlyles and Thackeray," in Nineteenth-Century Literary 
Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Lionel Stevenson, ed. Clyde de L. Ryals (Durham, NC: 
Duke Univ. Press, 1974). For a comparison of their philosophies of history and fiction, 
see Robert P. Fletcher, "'The Foolishest of Existing Mortals': Thackeray, 'Gurlyle,' and 
the Character(s) of Fiction," CLIO: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy 
of History (forthcoming). Though he doesn't mention Carlyle, A. Savkar Altinel, 
Thackeray and the Problem of Realism (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1986), aligns 
Thackeray with the former's philosophy when he claims that Barry Lyndon is a "virtually 
flawless work of art. . . ruled by a deep distrust of art" (p. 92). 
5 For a narrative of this traditional "problem" of epistemology, see Richard Rorty, Philoso? 
phy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979). 
6 William Charlton, "Feeling for the Fictitious," British Journal of Aesthetics 24:3 (1984): 
206-16, reminds us that such a recognition of the necessity of fictionality extends back 
in criticism at least to Samuel Johnson's Prefaces, if not to Sidney's Apology. The recent, 
theoretical interest in the overt, textual signalling of fictionality can be found in three 
books with different orientations to the subject, though they all make a case for the 
respectability of the phenomenon: Peter J. McCormick, Fictions, Philosophies, and the 
Problems of Poetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988); Michael Riffaterre, 
Fictional Truth (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1990); and 
Warhol, Gendered Interventions. The reversal of Coleridge that I acknowledge here 
derives (indirectly) from Riffaterre, who finds that "signs of fictionality" are always 
"suspending belief, by radically displacing verisimilitude" (p. 33). Warhol gives a fair 
representation of how overt signs of fictionality have been embarrassing to critics 
interested in realism. 
7 Thackeray's own statement on the differences between the charming fictions of Dickens 
and his own critical, "realistic" fictions comes in response to the comparison of the two 
novelists by David Masson. In his reply, Thackeray presents his well-known credo on the 
"sentiment of reality." See Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray, 
4 vols., ed. Gordon Ray (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), 2:771-73. 
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8 Perhaps no one has traced this development in Thackeray's career more thoroughly and 
with greater understanding of its importance to his art than Jack P. Rawlins, Thackeray's 
Novels: A Fiction that is True (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1974). Rawlins 
doesn't discuss Barry Lyndon, but many of the arguments made here about that novel 
accord with his treatment of other works such as Vanity Fair. 
9 Compare the analysis by Barbara Hardy, Forms of Feeling in Victorian Fiction (London: 
Peter Owen, 1985), of Barry's complex voice: "There is no virtue in Barry Lyndon, but 
he is endowed with some capacity for what we may call 'good' feeling. He is brilliantly 
shown as a master of almost all the forms of false feeling, but is allowed genuineness when 
he feels nostalgia, filial affection, paternal love, and hostility to war" (p. 79). 
10 James Fitzjames Stephen, "Barry Lyndon," from a review in the Saturday Review 
(December 27, 1856), ii, pp. 783-85. Reprinted in Geoffrey Tillotson and Donald Hawes, 
eds., Thackeray: The Critical Heritage (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968), pp. 26-28. 
11 Anthony Trollope, Thackeray (London: English Men of Letters series, 1879), pp. 70-76. 
Reprinted in Thackeray: The Critical Heritage, p. 30. 
12 In A Rhetoric of Fiction (1961; Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1983), Wayne C. Booth 
points to Trollope's reaction to Barry Lyndon as an example of "how strongly a prolonged 
intimate view of a character works against our capacity for judgment" (p. 322). In his brief 
commentary on the novel, Booth fits "Barry Lyndon's rhetorical vitality" (p. 323) into a 
context of fictions that confuse narrative "distance" through irony. 
13 See also Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1978): 
A natural utterance constitutes, for the listener, not only an invitation and 
provocation, but ultimately an obligation, to respond to the speaker. When we 
"listen" to someone, as distinguished from merely noticing or overhearing 
what he says?in other words, when we identify ourselves as his audience? 
we implicitly agree to make ourselves available to that speaker as the instru? 
ment of his interests. We agree not only to hear but to heed his promises, 
excuses, questions, and commands and also, of course, his assertions. Most 
simply, but most significantly, we agree to understand what he means, that is, 
to infer the motives and circumstances that occasioned his utterance. 
(Pp. 101-02) 
I would further extend Smith's notion of listening to the interpretation of texts, regardless 
of form. 
14 For narratology's concept of focalization, which distinguishes between "who is seeing" 
(traditional "point of view") and "who is speaking," see Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, 
Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London and New York: Methuen, 1983), 
pp. 71-85. 
15 William Makepeace Thackeray, The Memoirs of Barry Lyndon, Esq., edited and with an 
Introduction by Andrew Sanders (Oxford and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), 
p. 3. Further references to this edition will be cited in the text. 
16 Compare this dual skill of listening and double checking to Rawlins' description of the 
education in reading provided by Vanity Fair: "One must learn to read back and forth 
between Thackeray's 'realist' moral vision and his authorial commentary. Simply to 
discard the latter is to distort his work competely [sic]; to contain the two in one reading 
is difficult indeed" (Thackeray's Novels, p. 161). 
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Umberto Eco, "Lector in Fabula: Pragmatic Strategy in a Metanarrative Text," The Role 
of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 
1979), pp. 214-17. Further references to Eco will appear in the text. 
18 The tripartite division of any historical text into event-description-narration I borrow 
from Hay den White, who has focused on the necessarily figurative (i.e. fictive) basis of 
historical discourse. See, more recently, Hayden White, "The Real, the True, and the 
Figurative in the Human Sciences," Profession 92 (New York: MLA, 1992), pp. 15-17. 
For an interesting discussion of different forms of historical narrative and their respective 
effects on the reality constructed, see his "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation 
of Reality," in On Narrative, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), 
a collection of essays originally published in Critical Inquiry 7.1 (1980) and 7.4 (1981). 
19 Cp. Rawlins on Thackeray's interest in reader-response: 
Thackeray's sense that the novel's truest object of attention is ourselves has 
more important consequences than his frequent whimsical instructions to the 
reader, that he take the book's lesson to heart?"Remember how happy such 
benefactions made you . . . , and go off on the very first fine day and tip your 
nephew at school!" ... ; it also means that the responses by the reader to the 
text?his criteria for judgment?are always topics for discussion. 
(Thackeray's Novels, p. 177) 
20 Sanders, in his "Introduction" to the Oxford World's Classics edition of Barry Lyndon, 
provides a cogent analysis of the novel's concerns with fictionality and the reader's role: 
If Thackeray's stories always keep us alert to the fact of their fictionality, his 
historical stories forcibly remind us that history is the greatest lie of all . . . 
[Barry Lyndon] conspicuously suggests the degree to which a reader ought to 
distrust any teller of any tale, and especially a teller who purports both to tell 
the truth and to justify him- or herself . . . Thackeray's story makes us look 
directly at the shifting levels of meaning in the narrative itself. (P. xiii) 
21 I borrow from Eco (pp. 224-28) the term "narcotization" for a sort of linguistic shorthand 
that occurs in narrative and is often taken for granted as we read. It consists of the "storing" 
or momentary erasure of semantic (or narrative) information or alternative interpretive 
hypotheses that are available for a particular sign. In essence, we take a certain number 
of a narrator's explanations for granted, without searching our "semantic encyclopedias" 
for all the possible meanings of a term used or inferences to be drawn from an assertion. 
Narcotization as a textual manifestation is something akin to a "will to ignorance" or an 
intentional (though unremarked) "dumbing down" on the part of the interpreter (whether 
that be "writer" or "reader"). 
22 Micael M. Clarke's feminist reading of the novel ("Thackeray's Barry Lyndon: An Irony 
Against Misogynists," TSLL 29 [ 1987] : pp. 261 -77) argues convincingly for an alternative 
interpretation of almost every woman described by Barry, including Nora, and points out 
the pattern of male violence against women in the novel as something Thackeray wished 
to expose to Victorian society. 
23 See Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986), p. 78, 
on the use of formulaic schematization as a tool for infusing a narrative with significance. 
24 See, for example, Robert Colby, "Barry Lyndon and the Irish Hero," Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction 21 (1966): 109-30, who considers Barry as "simultaneously a self-exposing 
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scape-grace and something of an alter ego" for Thackeray. Colby, nonetheless, finds that 
these shifts between unreliable rogue and authorial persona attempt "a precarious balance 
which [Thackeray] maintains with surprisingly few lapses" (p. 128). 
25 Barbara Hardy reads this episode and Barry's report of it much as I do. She sees it as an 
example both of how Barry's "character is destabilized by r?le-playing and dishonesty, 
and [of how] his contradictions and inconsistencies are used by Thackeray to express 
emotions discretely and discontinuously" (Forms of Feeling, p. 80). 
26 Recognizing the cognitive similarities between self-deception and the emotional response 
a reader has to fiction, Jerry L. Guthrie, "Self-Deception and Emotional Response to 
Fiction," The British Journal of Aesthetics 21:1 (1981): 65-75, suggests a connection 
likewise between fictionalization and self-creation, a connection that could very well 
apply to Barry Lyndon: 
The self-deceiver becomes fictional, an actor in a play which he is constantly 
writing. And he believes in all the traits of this character, and in all of the events 
in this character's life, all of which he creates as author, in the same way that 
he believes in the traits of all fictional characters, and in the events in any work 
of fiction. That is, he makes-believe. (P. 74) 
27 Some of the narrator's names and disguises: Redmond Barry, Mr. Redmond of 
Redmondstown (p. 54), Captain Barry (p. 66), Lieutenant Fakenham (when he steals his 
officer's papers to escape from the English army, p. 78), a Hungarian servant (p. 112), his 
own uncle the Chevalier de Balibari (when dressed like him to effect an escape from 
Prussian service, p. 122), Redmond de Balibari (once he joins his uncle in a life of 
professional gambling, p. 128), Eugenio (in his love games with Lady Lyndon, p. 213), 
and finally Barry Lyndon (once he marries the widow of Sir Charles Lyndon, p. 233). 
Colby, "Barry Lyndon and the Irish Hero," also notes the "various mutations" of Barry's 
name and his "several disguises" (p. 111). 
28 Cf. Christine Brooke-Rose, "Whatever Happened to Narratology?," in Stories, Theories, 
and Things (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), p. 25: 
Part of the difficulty is that a fictional text is only fictional as a whole, each 
sentence separately has exactly the same form as a "true" sentence, which is 
what makes the problem of irony, or the poet's "lies" according to Plato, or (to 
take a more specific instance), the problem of "voice" in free indirect discourse 
... so difficult to analyse. 
See also, Gerald Prince, "Narratology, Narrative, and Meaning," Poetics Today 12:3 
(1991): 543-53: 
In short (and, mutatis mutandis, the same is true of any human semiotic 
instrument), there is no algorithm which, on the basis of textual factors, enables 
one to differentiate, in a narrative corpus, fiction from truth, error, or lying. The 
forms of narrative, its possibilities, are neither governed by its relationship to 
the real, nor do they indicate it. (P. 547) 
29 Richard Rorty, "Is There a Problem About Fictional Discourse?," Consequences of 
Pragmatism (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 132, suggests that those 
who are concerned about the logical status of fictional discourse (such as Searle and, I 
would add, Carlyle) are, in reality, worried that, if fictive and non-fictive utterances are 
shown to refer to the world in the same way, we will have no way of telling responsible 
from irresponsible language use. 
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30 See also Clarke, "An Irony Against Misogynists," pp. 266-72. 
31 For an analysis of the crisis of narrative, knowledge, and legitimation, which is suppos? 
edly paradigmatic for the late twentieth century, see Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984). References will appear in the 
text. 
3 2 For the notion of mise en abyme or subtext, see Lucien D?llenbach, The Mirror in the Text 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), or Michael Riffaterre, Fictional Truth (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1990). 
33 See Colby (pp. 112-13) who correctly cites this weakness as a specific type of snobbery: 
"Thackeray had a word for it: 'Two penny magnificence, indeed, exists all over Ireland 
and may be considered as the great characteristic of the Snobbishness of that country'" 
(p. 113). Also see Altinel, who observes that the novel's "entire action is controlled by 
the name Lyndon" (Thackeray and the Problem of Realism, p. 93). 
34 Altinel, too, points out that "Barry turns into a victim of his own myth" (Thackeray and 
the Problem of Realism, p. 93). 
35 As a contrast, see Hardy's incisive reading of this scene (Forms of Feeling, pp. 82-83). 
This content downloaded from 144.26.117.20 on Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:33:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
